This study explores the impact of investment characteristics, mainly investment location relative to the firm's primary market, on financing choices by real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Introduction
Capital structure decisions are one of the most important areas of corporate finance, spawning a large body of theoretical and empirical literature. 1 As the public ownership of commercial real estate through the real estate investment trust (REIT) structure developed over the last three decades and gained popularity with both retail and institutional investors, the study of REIT capital structure has also naturally attracted the attention of academic researchers, partly due to their tax-exempt status and limited ability to retain free cash flows to fund future investments. 2 Several real estate studies have examined the capital structure of REITs and have presented possible explanations of salient REIT capital structure features. As in the case of traditional corporations, firm characteristics are key determinants of REIT capital structure. A REIT's leverage is strongly related to profitability (Harrison et al. (2011) ), market-to-book (Feng et al. (2007) ; Harrison et al. (2011) ; Riddiough and Steiner (2015) ), asset tangibility (Harrison et al. (2011) ; Giambona et al. (2017) ; Liu et al. (2017) ), banking relationships (Hardin III and Wu (2010) ) and to some extent its competitive position within its property segment (Ertugrul and Giambona (2011) ). 3 Generally, the REIT capital structure literature uses firm-level data to examine the relation between capital structure and firm characteristics. But, since firm characteristics can be viewed as the cumulative outcome of past investment and divestment decisions, it is conceivable that individual project-level characteristics affect project-level financing decisions, subsequently leading to the observed relation between firm characteristics and capital structure. It may also be the case that two firms with similar capital structure have different approaches to project funding. Although there is an abundant literature relating firm capital structure and firm-level characteristics, evidence of heterogeneity in project level financing is scarce. We attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining the effects of investment characteristics on financing by REITs at the individual project level. Specifically, we focus on the relation between investment location -a key characteristic of real estate investments -and financing. We examine the propensity of REITs to use mortgage financing (secured debt), as opposed to other forms of financing, for property acquisitions in primary versus non-primary markets. 4 We define a REIT's primary market -discussed in more detail belowessentially as the state where the REIT has most of its commercial real estate investments. Our primary market measure refers to the geographic area, namely state(s), where the REIT has the most operating exposure, i.e., where most of its operating portfolio is located. We propose several measures to check the robustness of our findings.
What are the potential economic motivations for differences in REIT funding behavior in primary versus non-primary markets and how important are these motivations? As the empirical evidence shows, any difference in mortgage use by REITs relative to investment location likely stems from deliberate management decisions rather than supply factors. Local banks, large financial institutions, and commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) conduits are generally keen to provide this type of financing in most U.S. locations, particularly for REITs, who predominantly invest in highly pledgeable core real estate assets. Also, secured loans are less risky and more liquid than unsecured loans (Porta et al. (1997) ), ceteris paribus. After documenting this fact about mortgage use by REITs, we investigate the following two demand-side explanations: the agency problem and operating flexibility hypotheses. According to the agency problem hypothesis, REIT shareholders and unsecured lenders may want to limit managers' ability to pursue aggressive geographic expansion strategies into new markets for personal reasons. This is the classic principal-agent problem inherent in the corporate business structure. To mitigate this potential agency problem, the board and unsecured lenders may require the use of mortgage financing for investments in unfamiliar markets, leading to a differential use of mortgages in primary versus non-primary markets. As discussed later, secured lenders would provide outside project validation and monitoring.
A desire to maintain operating flexibility in primary markets may also lead to differences in mortgage use relative to investment location. For example, Li et al. (2016) note that firms' ability to raise debt without incurring financial inflexibility is correlated with optimal capital structure in the cross section in a way consistent with the conjecture that firms value financial flexibility. This corroborates with the economic intuition that firms value flexibility. Furthermore, Hartzell et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence that financial flexibility matters for REITs. Along a similar line of reasoning, REITs should value operating flexibility. Commercial mortgages typically include covenants that limit property owners' discretion on operating decisions (such as leasing and property redevelopment that may affect future cash flows or property values). Conversations with industry experts indicate that REITs generally avoid property-level (secured) debt to preserve operational flexibility. For example, an asset manager at a REIT in our sample stated that his company avoids property-level debt so that changes in individual tenant space demands (e.g., expansion, contraction, and relocation) could be met within the firm's portfolio of properties without getting approval from a particular secured debt lender. Mortgage financing may also limit the ability of managers to redevelop or even sell the mortgaged properties, particularly in the presence of a defeasance clause. Naturally, operating flexibility should be most valuable in the REITs' primary markets where the REIT has the most operational exposure.
The agency problem and operating flexibility explanations of a differential use of mortgage financing relative to location are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily the only possible explanations. 5 Consequently, we will not be able to test causality, but rather to show consistency.
Between these two proposed explanations, we hypothesize operational flexibility to be the most plausible motivation because there generally exists less costly means to mitigate agency issues.
The dearth of literature on the relationship between project-level characteristics and projectlevel financing can be explained by the fact that individual investment financing by most firms is not directly observable to outsiders. Firms tend to use internal cash combined with funds raised in bulk from debt and equity capital markets to finance current operations, future investments, dividend payments, and other corporate activities. 6 Furthermore, relevant information about the investments may be buried in the firms' financial statements. In other words, both individual investment decisions and financing for those investments are difficult to observe for traditional corporations. REITs, on the other hand, provide an ideal laboratory to explore the relation between investment characteristics and financing choices at the project level for several reasons. First, indi-5 Though not supported by the data, it is possible that, if unsecured financing is in limited supply, REITs would use it in their primary markets first and supplement any leftover with mortgages to fund investments in non-primary markets.
6 Mergers and acquisitions represent a notable exception where the source of financing can often be accurately identified (e.g., Asquith et al. (1990) ).
vidual investments and investment characteristics by REITs are observable. REITs largely invest in commercial properties and information on the properties' characteristics -including location -is generally accessible. Second, it is easier to identify individual project financing for REITs than for traditional corporations. Financing information on commercial real estate transactions by REITs, particularly for mortgaged properties, is more readily accessible than on asset purchases by traditional corporations. This is why we focus on the use of secured debt (e.g., mortgages) by REITs. 7 REITs allow us to overcome the challenges associated with connecting investment characteristics to project-level financing in traditional corporations. Finally, we focus on the relation between investment location, relative to the REIT's primary market, and financing because REITs generally invest in relatively homogeneous real estate assets, where location is the main differentiating factor. 8 However, this focus on investment location does not mean that location is the only characteristic relevant to financing. We also control for other investment characteristics in order to identify the effect of location on financing choice.
In lieu of mortgage financing, REITs can use unsecured public debt, unsecured bank loans, or equity to fund investment. For example, Brown and Riddiough (2003) and Hardin III and Wu (2010) indicate that REITs are constrained by their limited ability to accumulate cash from operations. Consequently, they often use unsecured bank lines to fund property acquisitions and development and then refinance those loans by raising cash in the bond market. Ott et al. (2005) show that only 7% of REITs' investments were funded by retained cash earnings in the 1990s, compared to 70% for other public firms. Unfortunately, data limitations preclude us from distinguishing among these other forms of financing. Thus, we remain agnostic about REITs' preferences over these alternative-funding sources given the lack of empirical evidence in support of the pecking-order theory (Harrison et al. (2011) ). However, we control for the REITs' previous debt and equity issuances in our empirical analysis and will comment on the likely use of these alternative funding sources whenever supported by the evidence.
In this paper, we use a large sample of commercial property acquisitions by 118 REITs from 7 In this paper, secured debt refers to first-lien mortgages, which generally cover 60% to 80% of the value of the property. The remaining portion of the financing is generally a combination of equity and second-mortgage or mezzanine debt.
8 Ambrose and Linneman (2001) show that the majority of REITs focus on one property sector (e.g., office, retail, multifamily, industrial, hotel) even though they may hold several different types of properties in their portfolio. Consistent with this finding, we show below that REITs generally acquire properties of the same type as their focus in our data. Furthermore, they generally operate prime, liquid real estate assets of significant collateral value.
Consistent with previous findings on REIT portfolio holdings (Ambrose and Linneman (2001) ; Capozza and Korean (1995) ), our data shows that REITs tend to focus their acquisitions in a specific property-type sector. In contrast, REITs' acquisitions are less geographically concentrated, with property acquisitions outside their primary markets as common occurrences. It appears that REITs expand operations geographically to benefit from economic diversification and/or to take advantage of growth opportunities in new markets. More importantly, the use of mortgage financing in the REITs' non-primary markets is on average 8% more likely than in their primary markets.
This finding is confirmed in multivariate estimations controlling for firm characteristics, transaction attributes, credit market conditions, year fixed effects, and property-type or firm fixed effects.
Depending on the model specification, REITs are 4.5% to 8.2% more likely to use mortgage financing outside their primary markets. As expected, the effect of investment location (relative to primary market) on the use of mortgage financing decreases in magnitude and statistical significance as we expand our definition of primary market. Also, the probability of mortgage financing increases with transaction size, the number of properties being acquired, leverage, and equity issuance, but decreases with firm size and cost of debt financing. The intuitive signs and significance of the effects of these control variables bolsters confidence in our main finding: investment location (in primary vs. non-primary market) appears to significantly affect financing choices.
REITs' reluctance to use mortgage financing in their primary markets does not appear to be driven by the distance between investment location and the acquirer's headquarters. In fact, distance does not significantly affect the likelihood of mortgage use on its own or when included in our model alongside our primary market dummy. Also, our finding is not driven by mortgage assumptions, a prevalent practice in commercial real estate finance. 9 Also, the way REITs report their major markets is not standardized, potentially making our primary market measure somewhat noisy. Consequently, we develop several alternative measures of primary market and show that the relation between primary market and mortgage use is robust.
Next, we show that our finding is consistent with a demand-side story using two methods. First, we use the 2008 financial crisis induced by the housing market meltdown as a exogenous shock to 9 It appears that REITs are more likely to assume mortgages on property acquisitions in primary than non-primary markets.
credit supply. Although this tail event resulted in a substantial increase in mortgage financing as expected, the effect of investment location on mortgage use remains unchanged, hence supporting a demand-side explanation of the documented differential use of mortgage in primary versus nonprimary markets by REITs. Next, we examine mortgage use by REITs relative to their access to the public debt capital market. According to Hardin III and Wu (2010) , REITs prefer public debt financing to mortgage debt in general. We find that the effect of property location on the likelihood of mortgage use is confined to REITs that have access to the public debt market. In other words, firms that have the choice between public debt and secured financing are also the firms that choose not to use secured financing in primary markets. Finally, we empirically test which of the agency problem and the operating flexibility hypotheses is consistent with the documented difference in mortgage use relative to investment locations. We show that our empirical results are consistent with the flexibility hypothesis.
Location is a defining characteristic of real estate investments, giving rise to the popular saying that the three most important attributes of real estate are location, location, and location. This is the first study exploring the role of investment location on financing decisions by REITs. It contributes to the growing literature examining the determinants of REIT capital structure, particularly the choice between unsecured and secured debt financing. More generally, this paper also contributes to the literature examining the importance of location in corporate finance. 10 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section "Data and Methodology" describes our data and the empirical methodology employed in the paper. In Section "Empirical Analysis", we present our main empirical analysis and additional tests suggesting a demand-side driver for our primary results. Section "Agency Issues or Flexibility" outlines two potential hypotheses consistent with the demand-side explanation and presents empirical tests for both hypotheses. Section "Conclusion" concludes.
We use property transaction data compiled by Real Capital Analytics (RCA), a leading commercial real estate data provider and analytics firm. 11 The original dataset contains 11,000 U.S. office, industrial, hotel, residential, and retail property transactions of $10 million or more completed between 2000 and 2015 where the buyer was a REIT. 12 For each transaction, RCA records property attributes, transaction characteristics, the parties involved in the transaction, and financing information that is crucial for the analysis in this paper. 13 Recorded property and transaction characteristics include property type, location, transaction price, property age, a sale-leaseback indicator, the cap rate, and whether the purchase is part of a portfolio acquisition. In addition, RCA identifies property buyers and buyer types (e.g. public REIT, corporation, or institutional).
RCA also specifies whether secured debt (i.e., mortgage financing) is used to finance the purchase and whether the mortgage was assumed. 14 We limit our analysis to the 10,333 transactions where the buyer is a public U.S. equity REIT.
We match the RCA data to buyer information available from SNL Financial. 15 SNL's real estate platform extensively covers public U.S. real estate companies, such as REITs, REOCs, and homebuilders. We retrieve from SNL the following company information for the equity REITs comprising our original RCA sample: property type focus, location of the firm's headquarters, reported major markets, property locations, financial information, security issuances, and the date of a firm's first public debt issuance. We then gather corresponding accounting information from Compustat. Next, we merge the property transactions with corporate credit spreads and average mortgage interest rate spreads at the time of the transaction (data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis). Specifically, we use Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield relative to the yield on a 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity (CMT) and the 30-Year Conventional Mortgage 11 RCA is a global private research firm that exclusively focuses on commercial real estate. RCA collects transactionlevel information on property sales and financing and provides services to commercial real estate investors. RCA also publishes various commercial real estate market price indices. We selected transactions involving a REIT as one of the listed buyers.
12 All dollar amounts in the paper are adjusted to year 2000 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 13 RCA collects information directly from participants in the transaction (e.g., buyer, seller, broker) or from public records.
14 In a recent study, Ghent and Valkanov (2015) use the mortgage information collected by RCA to examine the relationship between commercial mortgage characteristics and securitization.
15 SNL Financial is a provider of news, financial data, and expert analysis on banking, insurance, financial services, real estate, energy, media & communications, and metals & mining.
Rate minus the 10-year CMT. REITs. Accounting data is available for 9,872 of these transactions by 192 different REITs. Also, we require that SNL has information on the REIT's primary markets (discussed below). This significantly reduces the number of usable observations to 6,268 transactions and potentially introduces selection bias. We develop alternate measures of the firm's primary market in Section "Other Measures of Primary Market" to address this potential issue, but data constraints do not allow us to fully eliminate this concern. Our main sample contains 6,268 properties acquired by 118 public U.S. equity REITs during the 15-year period covered by the study (2001 through 2015) . Table 2 breaks down the REITs by focus and the transactions by property type in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. 16 More than 50% of the REITs in our sample focus on retail and office properties.
Multifamily is the next largest REIT type (15%), with the remainder split between diversified, industrial, and hotel REITs. In terms of transactions by property types, office and retail represent roughly 55% of our sample. This is not surprising since most of our REITs focus in these sectors as well. 17 Table 2 shows that our data covers a wide range of REIT types and property types. Table 3 reports characteristics of the REITs in our sample based on firm-year observations. Out of 752 firm-year observations, firm size ranges from $106 million to $25 billion, with a mean of $2.4 billion in 2000 dollars. The average leverage of 0.51 (defined as total debt scaled by total assets) and secured debt of 0.53 (defined as total secured debt scaled by total debt) is high relative to non-REIT corporations, but are representative of the real estate industry in general. On average, firms hold 2% of their total assets in cash. Since REITs are subject to stringent earnings distribution requirements, the low level of average cash holdings is expected. Last, we present statistics for public debt and equity issuances of those REITs in our sample. Because of the considerable heterogeneity in firm size, it is likely that the REITs in our sample do not have equal access to public debt markets, one of the preferred sources of investment funding for public REITs. We address the 16 Since 95% of the properties purchased by health care REITs are office buildings we classify the focus of health care REITs as office. This reclassification does not affect our results.
17 For 89% of the transactions in our data, the property purchased in the transaction is of the same type (retail, office, etc.) as the REIT's property type focus. Thus, the data shows that REITs seldom stray away from their declared property type.
implications of this issue on our main results in Section "Demand-Side Evidence". In our sample, REITs access public debt/equity markets 0.89/1.54 times per year on average. It is worth noting that the median numbers of public debt and equity issuances per year are zero and one, respectively.
Our goal is to determine whether investment characteristics impact REITs' financing choices.
To investigate this question, we estimate a linear probability model of the use of mortgage financing similar to Brown and Riddiough (2003) . Specifically, we estimate the following equation using the commercial property transactions in our data set:
where M ORT G ijt is an indicator variable that equals one if a mortgage was used to buy property i, by firm j, with property type focus k, in year t. Specifically, M ORT G ijt takes a value of one if RCA reports a non-missing value in its loan amount field. 18 We condition the likelihood of mortgage use on an indicator for whether the transaction occurred in the firm's primary market, transaction attributes, firm characteristics and variables measuring the cost of debt financing. As described in Table 1 , many of the conditioning variables are lagged relative to the dependent variable.
P RIM ARY M ARKET i is the key independent variable of interest and is equal to one if the property purchased is located in the REIT's primary market. To determine the REIT's primary market, we rely on information provided by SNL, which collects information annually from each REIT's 10-K report (if available) on the percentage of the firm's net operating income (NOI), revenue, and occupancy in their declared key markets. SNL then ranks the firm's top ten markets based on the share of NOI. For example, if California has the highest percentage of NOI for a specific REIT in a given year, California will be listed as the first market in SNL's database for that year. The second market for that firm (if a second market exists) would be the market that has the second highest percentage of NOI. SNL lists up to ten markets for each REIT/year. If NOI information is not available, SNL then ranks the markets based on revenue. If both NOI and 18 RCA collects mortgage information at the time of the transaction and also separately captures refinancings later if the information is available. Our analysis focuses on the use of mortgage financing at the time of purchase since REIT managers have the discretion to refinance mortgaged properties at any time for various reasons not necessarily related to the initial financing decision. revenue are not available, then SNL ranks based on market occupancy. Finally, if NOI, revenue, and occupancy are not available, SNL ranks the markets alphabetically. P RIM ARY M ARKET i takes a value of one if the transaction occurs in the firm's first market (in the previous year) as listed by SNL. Since ranking alphabetically carries no meaning in our context, we discard observations where markets are ranked based on alphabetical order.
We note a few limitations of the information provided by SNL used to determine the firm's primary market. First, geographic market information (NOI, revenue, and occupancy) is only available if the firm reports this information in its annual 10-K report, which may introduce selection bias. Second, the geographic markets in the SNL database are not standardized. A market can be a city, a state, or a region (e.g., Mid-Atlantic). 19 For 92% of the observations in our sample, the firm's primary market is either a city or a state. If the firm's primary market is a city, we reclassify primary market to be the state in which that city is located. If the firm's primary market is a city or state, P RIM ARY M ARKET i is equal to one if the purchased property is located in To alleviate concerns with the construction of P RIM ARY M ARKET i , we report robustness checks in Section "Other Measures of Primary Market" using other versions of the variable meant to capture whether the transaction occurred in the REIT's primary market. Our first alternative measure, Primary Market (State), is the same as P RIM ARY M ARKET i except that it excludes observations where the firm's primary market is listed as a region. Using commercial property information available from SNL, 20 we also calculate the total square footage each firm holds in each state every year, as well as the share of that firm's overall portfolio that is located in each state. Primary State (% Sq. Ft.) is an indicator variable that equals one if the purchased property is located in the state where the firm holds the largest share of its portfolio (in the year prior to the acquisition). 21 State Market Share (% Sq. Ft.) is a continuous variable that measures the percentage of the firm's property portfolio that is located in the state of the transaction (in the year prior to acquisition). Finally, Primary Market Alt. is an indicator equal to one if either Primary State (% Sq. Ft.) or P RIM ARY M ARKET i is equal to one. The advantage of using Primary Market Alt. is that it increases our usable sample from 6,268 to 7,677 observations. The control variables in equation (1) are mainly of two types, transaction attributes and firm characteristics, and are selected following the REIT capital structure literature (e.g., Brown and Riddiough (2003) ; Hardin III and Wu (2010) ; Harrison et al. (2011) ). Transaction attributes (T RAN S i ) in equation (1) include the distance between the purchased property and the REIT's headquarters, transaction size, and an indicator variable for whether the transaction is part of a portfolio acquisition. 22 In some specifications, we also include the age of the purchased property, an indicator for a sale-leaseback transaction, and the cap rate, however, since this information is missing for many of the observations in the RCA data, we exclude these variables for most of our analysis. Time-varying firm characteristics, represented in our model by F IRM jt , include firm size, leverage, secured debt, cash, market-to-book, previous public debt issuances and previous public equity issuances. 23 R t includes the corporate credit spread and the mortgage spread at the time of the transaction. Furthermore, we include a number of fixed effects. Namely, we include year fixed effects (Y ear t ) to account for changes in macroeconomic fundamentals over time; REIT property type focus fixed effects (REIT k ) to control for heterogeneity in funding strategies across 21 There will be observations where the firm's property portfolio information is available, but P RIM ARY M ARKETi is not available, and vice versa.
22 Regarding the need to control for distance, previous studies argue that asymmetric information increases with distance (Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) and Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) ). Intuitively, economic decision makers (e.g., buyers or lenders) have better information on projects located nearby. However, information asymmetry as it relates to distance is probably less of a concern in this study for several reasons. First, since REITs tend to invest in large, relatively high quality real estate assets, the information asymmetries are likely to be relatively small (as compared to the smaller commercial properties studied in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) ). Second, Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) argue that one way investors resolve these informational issues is by purchasing nearby properties. But REITs often buy properties at great distances from their headquarters, which runs counter to the informational argument in Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004) . Finally, we find it difficult to believe that REITs would suffer from information asymmetry when investing at a distance given their expertise and industry focus. Rather, if informational/agency issues exist, they are more likely to be related (negatively) to the REITs' market exposure as opposed to the REITs distance from the property. We investigate this possibility further in Section "Agency Problem Hypothesis".
23 The firm life cycle is likely to affect the probability of mortgage use. Unfortunately, we do not have firm age data to address this concern. However, in unreported results we proxy for firm age using the difference between the transaction date and the IPO date for the REIT. The results reported in the paper are materially unchanged when we include this proxy for firm age and firm age squared. different property types; and firm fixed effects to account for heterogeneity across firms. 24 Finally, η it captures the error term. Although we use a linear probability model to estimate equation (1), unreported robustness checks confirm that our results are materially unchanged when we employ a nonlinear specification (e.g. probit).
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present the empirical analysis testing the relation between investment characteristics and funding choices for acquisitions by REITs. We first perform univariate analysis for transactions located in the primary and non-primary market in Section "Univariate analysis".
Next, we estimate equation (1) and provide our baseline results in Section "Baseline Results". We then provide robustness checks by re-estimating equation (1) with alternative measures of primary market in Section "Other Measures of Primary Market". Although we define primary market in a geographic sense, it is also possible that primary market investment can be defined along other dimensions (e.g., property type, property characteristics). We investigate this possibility in Section "Property Type and Property Characteristics". We then expand our geographic definition of primary market in Section "Expanded Definition of Primary Market". In Section "Demand-Side Evidence", we present subsample analysis to distinguish between supply-side and demand-side explanations for our main result. Then, we investigate the relation between public debt and equity issuances and investment characteristics to lend further support for the demand-side explanation.
In Section "Agency Issues or Flexibility", we outline two potential hypotheses consistent with the demand-side explanation (agency problem hypothesis vs. flexibility hypothesis) and empirically test these two hypotheses.
Univariate analysis
Since we want to examine the relation between investment characteristics and mortgage financing choices, we first present various transaction level characteristics for properties located in REITs' primary and non-primary markets. Our final sample contains 1,010 primary market transactions and 5,258 non-primary market transactions. It is worth noting that the low-share of primary market 24 Note that firm fixed effects absorb property type focus fixed effects.
transactions (16.11%) reflects the fact that most REITs acquire and operate properties in multiple markets. But based on the information we have collected for this study, REITs maintain on average 43% of their rentable space in their primary market, which lends credibility to our primary market measure.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 present transaction-level characteristics for primary and nonprimary market transactions, respectively. Column (3) presents unconditional mean difference tests between columns (1) and (2). 25 Several important facts emerge from Table 4 . First and foremost, REITs' use of mortgage financing varies across primary and non-primary markets. In primary markets, 28% of the purchases are financed with mortgage debt. However, in non-primary markets, mortgages are used in 36% of the transactions. This difference (8%) is economically large and statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence, as indicated in column (3). This provides support for the hypothesis that financing choices are related to investment characteristics (primary vs. non-primary markets) -the main focus of this paper. There are also other important differences between primary market and non-primary market transactions. Purchases in primary markets tend to be larger ($27.11 versus $23.34 million in 2000 dollars), but are less likely to be part of a portfolio acquisition. Since REITs tend to be headquartered within (or near) their primary markets, the distance between the firm's headquarters and the property location is smaller in primary markets (166 miles vs. 608 miles). In sum, Table 4 provides preliminary evidence that mortgage financing choices vary across primary and non-primary markets. The other differences in transaction characteristics in Table 4 , however, suggest that we need to control for these characteristics when examining differences in financing choices across primary and non-primary markets.
Baseline Results
In the previous section, we provide univariate evidence concerning the relation between primary market and mortgage financing, but note that primary market transactions differ from non-primary market transactions along several dimensions. Hence, in this section we investigate whether the negative relation between primary market and mortgage financing remains after controlling for other transaction-level characteristics by estimating several variants of equation (1). In all specifications, the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the transaction is financed with a mortgage, and zero otherwise.
Column (1) of Table 5 presents coefficient estimates from our baseline model. The coefficient on Primary Market is negative and statistically significant, indicating that REITs are less likely to use mortgage financing for acquisitions in their primary market after controlling for transaction, firm, and market characteristics. Moreover, the economic magnitude of this effect is large as well. Primary Market decreases the likelihood of mortgage financing by eight percentage points, ceteris paribus. Relative to the mean likelihood of the mortgage financing, this represents a 24% decrease. 26 On the other hand, distance is negatively associated with the REITs' propensity to use mortgage financing -we will further discuss the role of distance later in this section. This baseline specification, which does not include any fixed effects, yields a negative relation between primary market and distance. However, the distance between the firm and the investment does not drive the relation between primary market and mortgage financing.
The coefficients on the other control variables are generally consistent with economic intuition. Larger transactions and portfolio acquisitions are more likely to be financed with mortgages.
Smaller REITs are more likely to use mortgage financing. Consistent with Riddiough and Steiner (2015) , we find that leverage is positively related to mortgage financing. Riddiough and Steiner (2015) argue that highly levered firms are close to their maximum debt capacity, and secured funding enables the firm to expand debt capacity without exacerbating certain agency problems. 27 The coefficient on secured debt (scaled by total debt) is positive but not statistically different from zero.
Column (1) also shows that firms with larger cash holdings as a percentage of assets are more likely to use mortgage financing. One possible explanation is that firms accumulate cash because they have limited access to unsecured debt and equity financing. We also consider two variables related to the firm's access to other financing choices: public debt issuances and public equity issuances in the previous year. 28 The coefficient on previous public debt issuances is negative, which may indicate that public debt issuers have better access to unsecured debt financing and are therefore 26 8.2% divided by the unconditional mean of 34.1% (not reported). 27 For firms with unsecured debt, high leverage may lead to two agency problems between managers and debt holders: over-investment (asset substitution) and underinvestment (Stulz and Johnson (1985) ). Using secured debt to fund new investments segregates those assets from the firms' existing assets, hence mitigating these potential agency problems.
28 Using public debt and equity issuances scaled by total assets, rather than total number of issuances, has no effect on our results (unreported). less likely to use mortgage financing. We will return to this hypothesis in Section "Demand-Side Evidence". Previous public equity issuances, on the other hand, are positively related to mortgage use. Finally, we include two variables related to the cost of debt financing. The corporate credit spread is negatively related to the use of mortgage financing, but surprisingly the mortgage spread is positively related to mortgage use. However, we note that the mortgage spread is based on residential (rather than commercial) mortgage rates.
Column (2) of Table 5 includes year fixed effects to control for nation-wide changes in economic conditions. The inclusion of year-fixed effects thus identifies the average within-year changes in the dependent variable as a function of the independent variables in the regressions. Similar to the results in column (1), the primary market variable is significantly negatively associated with the funding decision. As for the control variables, the signs and significance level of the coefficient estimates in column (2) are broadly similar to those in column (1). A few notable exceptions exist. First, distance is no longer significantly related to mortgage use in column (2). Also, higher market-to-book values are now negatively related to mortgage use. Finally, the corporate credit spread is not significantly associated with mortgage financing in column (2), which suggests that the year fixed effects absorb its effect on mortgage financing.
In column (3), we add REIT property focus fixed effects to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in funding strategies across different property types. This is based on the anecdotal evidence that there might exist significant heterogeneity in mortgage use across different property focuses. The inclusion of year and property focus fixed effects identifies the average within-year and within-REIT-type changes in the dependent variable as a function of the independent variables in the regressions. Note that Primary Market continues to be negatively related to the use of mortgage financing.
Finally in column (4) of Table 5 , we include firm fixed effects to account for unobserved timeinvariant heterogeneity in funding strategies across different firms. Note that this additional fixed effect subsumes REIT-type fixed effects. Thus, the estimates in column (4) identify the average within-year and within-firm changes in the dependent variable as a function of the independent variables in the regressions. The results are similar to those in the first three columns. Although the magnitude of the coefficient is somewhat reduced after including firm fixed effects, Primary Market is still associated with a 4.5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of mortgage financing, or a 13% decrease relative to the mean. Compared to column (3), the coefficient of distance is still negative but insignificant. Since distance and primary market are highly correlated in our sample (-0.30), we further investigate the role of distance in Table A1 in the appendix using the model specification in column (4). This exercise shows that the effect of primary market remains unchanged when we exclude distance from the model and that distance has no significant effect on the likelihood of mortgage when we exclude primary market. 29
Next, we address potential econometric and data concerns. First, a linear probability estimation method may be seen as somewhat restrictive. To test the robustness of our finding relative to estimation method, we run a probit estimation of the model in column (4) of Table 5 . The marginal effect of primary market on mortgage financing estimated from the probit model is presented in Table A2 in the appendix and is similar to the OLS estimate. 30 Another potential concern is the need to cluster standard errors. The significance of the previous coefficient estimates is relative to their White's heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Even though clustering standard errors may make sense, it is unclear whether we should use firm, year, or property type clusters. We show in Table A3 that our main finding remains unchanged if we use any of these three levels of clustering.
Finally, we address a potential concern stemming from mortgage assumptions (when the purchaser buys the property subject to the existing mortgage), a common practice in commercial real estate finance. Although mortgage assumption is just another way for property buyers to access financing, for observed transactions where mortgage debt is assumed the buyer may have had less choice about financing. For example, if prepayment is explicitly prohibited on a commercial mortgage, assumption of the mortgage is a necessary condition for a sales transaction to occur. Thus, it may be informative to examine the role debt assumption plays in this study, if any. To address this issue, we add an indicator variable into equation (1) that equals one if existing mortgage debt is assumed by the buyer. We also estimate equation (1) excluding observations where mortgage debt is assumed. We report these results in Table A4 . As expected, column (1) shows that assumptions are strongly related to mortgage use. However, our primary market variable is still negatively related to mortgage use after controlling for mortgage assumptions. In column (2) we interact Primary Market with the indicator for mortgage assumption and find that when not assuming 29 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 30 The results of the other probit regressions are available from the authors upon request. mortgage debt, Primary Market is negatively related to mortgage use. More importantly, our main result remains unchanged on the subsample excluding assumptions in column (3). Therefore, we can unequivocally state that the finding of study is independent to mortgage assumption activity.
Other Measures of Primary Market
In Section "Baseline Results", we provide evidence of a strong negative relation between primary market investment and mortgage financing. In this section, we use several alternative definitions of primary market to ensure that the negative relation between mortgage financing and primary market is robust. As discussed in Section "Data and Methodology", a potential issue with Primary Market is that the market fields reported by SNL are not standardized, hence leading to a noisy measure. For example, some firms report regions (e.g., Mid-Atlantic) as their markets. Although this only occurs for 8% of the observations in our sample, we re-estimate equation (1) excluding those observations where the firm listed a region as it primary market. Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the coefficient on primary market when we exclude those observations is identical to the coefficient reported in column (4) of Table 5 .
We also calculate the total square footage each firm holds in each state every year, as well as the share of that firm's overall portfolio that is located in each state using property portfolio information available from SNL financial. Primary State (% Sq. Ft.) is an indicator variable that equals one if the purchased property is located in the state where the firm holds the largest share of its portfolio. 31 Notice that the sign, significance and magnitude of the coefficient on Primary Market (% Sq. Ft.) in column (2) of Table 6 is similar to Primary Market (State) in column (1).
State Market Share (% Sq. Ft.) is a continuous variable that measures the percentage of the firm's property portfolio in the previous year that is located in the state of the transaction. We use the standard deviation of state market share in our sample to standardize this variable, thus the coefficient estimate on State Market Share (% Sq. Ft.) can be interpreted as the increase in likelihood of mortgage financing with a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the firm's square footage that is located in the state of the transaction. Column (3) shows that a one standard deviation increase in the state's market share of the firm's portfolio is associated with a 3.1% decrease in the likelihood of mortgage use. Finally, Primary Market Alt. is an indicator equal 31 We thank Walter Boudry and David Downs for suggesting this alternative measure.
to one if either Primary Market or Primary State (% Sq. Ft.) is equal to one. The advantage of using Primary Market Alt. is that it increases our usable sample from 6,268 to 7,677 observations because each of these measures is available for different firm/years. Column (4) of Table 6 shows that this final measure of primary market is also negatively related to mortgage use.
Taken together, columns (1) through (4) of Table 6 demonstrate that the relationship between primary market and mortgage financing is robust to several different measures of primary market.
Property Type and Property Characteristics
To this point, our measure of primary market has focused exclusively on geography. However, it is important to note that REITs primary markets can be defined along other dimensions. For example, it is common for REITs to focus their business on a certain property type (e.g., office, retail, etc.). Thus, a property transaction could be considered a primary market transaction if the property purchased is of the same type as the firm's focus. 32 In this section we consider whether firms finance primary property types differently from non-primary property types. To investigate this possibility, we create an indicator variable (Primary Property Type) that takes a value of one if the type of property purchased equals the property focus of the REIT as indicated by SNL.
For example, if a REIT that focuses on office properties purchases an industrial property, Primary Property Type will equal zero. It is relatively rare for a REIT to purchase a property of a different type than its focus. In our sample, this occurs only on 11% of the transactions. We exclude observations where the REITs' focus is "Diversified" since we cannot determine if the property type is the primary focus for the firm.
We re-estimate equation (1) including our primary property type indicator. Column (1) of Table   7 reports the results while excluding our geographic measure of primary market. The coefficient on Primary Property Type is not significantly different from zero. In other words, when we define a primary investment based on the property type, there is no association between financing and primary investment. More importantly, when we include Primary Market along with Primary Property Type in column (2), the coefficient on our geographic measure of primary market is similar to our earlier results. The probability of mortgage financing is four percentage points lower when the property is located in the firm's primary geographic market, ceteris paribus. The results in 32 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Table 7 suggest that the geographic focus, rather than property type focus, affects the type of debt financing.
Undoubtedly, additional property and transaction characteristics affect the use of mortgage financing and may also correlate with our primary market measure. We cannot include many characteristics in our main specification (except for distance, transaction size, and portfolio acquisition) because they are not well populated in the data. We selectively include additional characteristics based on information availability. We re-estimate equation (1) including property age, a leaseback indicator, and the cap rate in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 8 , respectively. The age of the property in column (1) is positively related to mortgage financing while the leaseback indicator in column (2) is negatively related to financing. In column (3), we see that the cap rate is not significantly related to secured financing. In column (4), we include all three of the additional transaction characteristics in the same estimation. Property age remains significantly positively related to age, but neither Leaseback nor Cap Rate is significantly related to the likelihood of mortgage use. Most importantly, Primary Market is significantly negatively related to mortgage use in every column of Table 8 after controlling for these additional property and transaction characteristics. The results in Table 8 help assuage concerns that omitted transaction characteristics or property attributes might drive the relation between primary market and mortgage financing.
Expanded Definition of Primary Market
In Section "Baseline Results", we define primary market as an indicator variable that equals one if the transaction is located within the firm's primary market. Firms also list additional markets that they focus on (e.g., secondary, tertiary, quaternary, etc.). We now re-estimate equation (1) using expanded definitions of primary market. In essence, we are performing an exercise analogous to a falsification test. If the significant relation documented is Table 5 is truly about primary market investment, then we would expect the relation to weaken (or disappear) as we expand the definition of primary market. Table 9 presents coefficient estimates from equation (1) with expanded measures of primary market investment. All estimations in Table 9 use the most penalizing model specification which includes year fixed effects to account for unobserved market-wide changes over time and firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant heterogeneity across firms. Column (1) of Table 9 is identical to column (4) in Table 5 and is reported for ease of comparison. In column (2) of Table 9 , Primary Market equals one if the transaction is located within the firm's reported primary or secondary market. Primary Market in columns (3) and (4) equals one if the property is located within the firm's reported top three or four markets, respectively. Notice that the estimated coefficient on the primary market variable decreases in (absolute) magnitude and loses its statistical significance as we expand the definition of primary market. At the same time, the coefficients and statistical significance of the other control variables remain largely unchanged (omitted from Table 9 to save space). We interpret this result as evidence that the relation between primary market investment and mortgage financing is largely in relation to the firm's primary geographic market where it derives a significant portion of income.
Demand-Side Evidence
The mortgage financing activity we observe in the data results from both mortgage supply and demand factors. To properly interpret the relation between primary market and mortgage financing revealed by this study, we first need to understand the supply and demand of mortgages in each market. Although one can reasonably argue that the supply of secured financing for real estate investments is relatively elastic given the high collateral value of real estate (Harrison et al. (2011); Giambona et al. (2014) ) 33 , we should normally consider mortgage supply and demand factors. One way to accomplish this is to examine changes in mortgage use by REITs in response to demand or supply shocks if possible. First, we look at the supply side by examining the impact of the 2008 credit crisis on mortgage use by REITs relative to investment location. Next, we consider the financing choices of REITs in relation to their i.) ability to access the public debt market and ii.) previous debt and equity issuances.
Effect of Financial Crisis
In this section we control for the effect of the 2008 credit crisis which can be characterized as an exogenous shock to credit supply, including mortgage financing. When uncertainty about throughout the economy. Because of its secured nature, collateralized financing (including mortgage debt) is normally readily available for most firms throughout the business cycle and during periods of severe economic shocks like the 2008 financial crisis. 34 In column (1) of Table 10 we add to our baseline model a financial crisis indicator variable set equal to one for transactions that occurred during the financial crisis (2008) (2009) (2010) . As expected, the financial crisis resulted in a substantial increase in mortgage use for the reasons discussed earlier.
As column (1) shows though, the effect of investment location relative to primary market on mortgage use remains unchanged compared to our baseline result in column (4) of Table 5 . Obviously, there is no reason to believe that the availability of mortgage financing for REITs is dependent on investment location, even during periods of economic uncertainty. Next, we run our main estimation on the subsample excluding the observations that occurred during the financial crisis. The results are reported in column (2) of Table 10 . Again, our main primary market remains negatively related to mortgage use, showing that the upstick in mortgage use during the crisis years was not a determinant factor in explaining our results.
Access to Public Debt
To further bolster the demand-side interpretation of our results, we should show that public debt is at least available for those transactions financed with mortgages. Put differently, we have to demonstrate that the firm chooses mortgage debt over unsecured debt. Mortgage financing can be selected because it is the desirable financing choice, or because it is the next (or only) choice on the financing menu. We examine the use of mortgages by REITs with and without access to the bond market. For this analysis, we hand collect data on REITs' access to the public debt market.
If the firm had a public bond rating at any point prior to the purchase transaction, we assume that the firm has access to public debt markets. Not surprisingly, transactions by firms with access to public debt markets are significantly less likely to use a mortgage relative to firms that do not have access to public debt markets in our data (32% versus 41%). Unsecured debt financing, in the form of public debt or unsecured loans, is likely preferable to secured borrowing for most REITs (Hardin III and Wu (2010) ). However, we are interested in whether REITs that have access to an alternative source of long-term debt financing are less likely to use mortgage financing in their primary markets. An affirmative response to this question would provide suggestive evidence in support of a demand, rather than supply, explanation of our results: REITs deliberately choose what type of financing to use depending on the investment location.
To implement this test, we divide our sample into two subsamples on the basis of the REITs' prior access to the public debt market and re-estimate equation (1) for each subsample. The coefficient estimates are reported in Table 11 . Column (1) shows a large and statistically significant relationship between Primary Market and mortgage use for firms that have access to public debt markets. However, the coefficient estimate of Primary Market is not statistically different from zero for the subsample that has not accessed public debt markets before the transaction. In other words, the firms that have another option for long-term debt financing (e.g., public debt markets) are the same firms that are less likely to use mortgages for primary market investments. We are careful not to interpret these results too strongly since we do not observe the long-term financing choices on non-mortgaged properties (e.g., equity, public debt, term loans). However, the results in Table 11 are consistent with a demand-side explanation for the negative relation between primary market investment and mortgage financing.
Public Debt and Equity Issuances
In Sections "Baseline Results" through "Expanded Definition of Primary Market", we document a robust negative relation between investment location and financing choice and show that the relation diminishes as we expand our definition of primary market. Furthermore, we demonstrate in the previous section that this relation is particularly large for firms that have the ability to access public debt markets, providing some evidence of a demand-side explanation. In this section, we provide further evidence of the demand-side explanation by examining the relationship between primary and non-primary market purchase volume and public debt and equity issuance.
We estimate the following linear model:
where M KT V OLU M E jt is the natural logarithm of one plus firm j's total volume of primary or non-primary purchase transactions in year t. Our estimation procedure will entail two separate regressions: one for primary market volume and one for non-primary market volume. 35 DEBT ISS jt is an indicator equal to one if the firm issued public debt in the prior year and EQU IT Y ISS jt is an indicator equal to one if the firm issued equity in the prior year. Each observation in equation (2) is a firm/year. F IRM jt includes time varying firm characteristics. We also include year fixed effects. Our coefficient of interest is β. Given the documented negative relation between mortgage use and primary market investments, we expect β to be positive when the dependent variable is primary market volume if REITs use public debt financing for primary market transactions. In contrast, we would expect β to be non-positive in non-primary markets. We cannot make any strong prediction about γ. It may be positive in both estimations if REITs issue equity to fund future property acquisitions in primary and non-primary markets. Of course, it is also possible the REITs use other sources of financing (e.g., lines of credit, retained earnings) for their property acquisitions, and in this case neither β nor γ should be different from zero.
Column (1) of Table 12 reports coefficient estimates from equation (2). If firms use public bond markets to finance subsequent primary market purchases we would expect β > 0. Indeed, this is exactly what we find. On the other hand, equity issuance is not significantly related the volume of primary purchases. In column (2), neither debt nor equity issuance is significantly related to non-primary market financing. The results in "Annual Public Debt and Equity Issuances", coupled with our results from Section "Access to Public Debt", provide suggestive evidence that firms are more likely to use public debt, rather than mortgage debt, to finance primary market purchases.
This is consistent with a demand-side explanation.
Agency Issues or Flexibility
In Section "Demand-Side Evidence", we show that the negative relation between primary market and mortgage financing is consistent with a demand-side explanation. In this section, we discuss and test two demand-side hypotheses: the agency problem hypothesis and the flexibility hypothesis. 36
Agency Problem Hypothesis
As noted in the introduction, the division of ownership and management may lead REIT managers to undertake aggressive geographic expansion away from their primary markets for personal reasons. For example, managers may succumb to the prestige associated with managing a large firm present in most major markets or their compensation may be tied to the REITs' total revenues. Concerned about this agency problem, shareholders and unsecured lenders may require that investments in non-primary markets be financed with mortgage debt since it includes three important features that mitigate this potential agency problem. First, secured lenders provide third party validation regarding the quality of the non-primary investments, and are particularly incentivized to verify the quality of the projects if the loans are non-recourse as is often the case for commercial real estate. Second, mortgage lenders will closely monitor the performance of the properties since the loans will be repaid from cash flows generated by those properties. Consequently, requiring management to use mortgage financing is a way of contracting out the vetting and monitoring of non-primary investments to third parties that specialize in those tasks. 37 Finally, mortgage financing may limit contagion from a non-performing asset to the REIT's other assets if, as is often the case, the mortgage loan is made to a special purpose vehicle capitalized by the REIT. This could protect the REIT's primary assets from poorly performing non-primary assets. 38
Should this agency problem be the main reason behind the higher frequency of secured financing 36 These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, nor do they represent the only possible explanations of the documented relation between mortgage financing and investment location. For example, growth REITs that generally in the middle of their life-cycle may not have unfettered access to the public debt market, which may force them to use mortgage financing more as they expand into new markets. Yet empirically identifying growth REITs is difficult. However, our results are materially unchanged when we proxy for firm life cycle with age.
37 As residual project owners, shareholders will however still bear the associated higher cost of secured financing. 38 In theory, the SPV makes the collateral bankruptcy-remote, enabling the lender to seize the collateral relatively quickly in the case that the REIT goes bankrupt. Thus, screening and monitoring of the collateral (rather than the borrower) is of critical importance. However, as discussed in Li et al. (2016) , bankruptcy courts have some discretion in determining whether an SPV actually receives bankruptcy-remote status. Since this calls into question the bankruptcy-remoteness of the collateral for the lender, this may weaken the argument for project-level monitoring as the reason for using secured debt. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention. observed on the REITs' non-primary investments, we would expect the effect to fade away over time as management gains experience in those markets. In other words, as a REIT demonstrates a positive investment track record in a non-primary market, this potential agency issue will be less severe and the need for third party project validation and monitoring will decline. In this sense, experience in non-primary markets should then be negatively correlated with mortgage use.
To test this prediction, we estimate the following regression on the subsample of transactions that occur in non-primary markets:
where EXP ERIEN CE i is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of acquisitions that the firm completed in the subject property's region in the previous five years. The regions included in the RCA data are Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Northeast, Southeast, Southwest, and West. Since we need transactions in the region by the firm in the previous five years, our regression will include only transactions from 2005 or later. EXP ERIEN CE is meant to capture the firm's experience in the region. If the positive relation between non-primary market investment and mortgage financing is driven by management's need to obtain third party verification to mitigate agency issues, then we would expect β < 0 since concerns over agency issues should decline as the firm gains more experience in the non-primary market. Table 13 presents the coefficient estimates from equation (3). Firm experience in the nonprimary region is positively related to the likelihood of mortgage financing. This contradicts the agency problem hypothesis. In unreported robustness checks, we use different periods for the experience variable (e.g., one, two, three, and four years) and an alternative geographic definition (state-level) and the results are qualitatively similar. Namely, for non-primary transactions, we do not find evidence that mortgage use decreases with experience. 39 These results do not support the agency problem hypothesis.
39 Defining experience using region and the previous five years is the only specification where experience is positive and significant. All other variants show that mortgage use is not statistically significantly related to experience in non-primary markets. We report the five year region experience results since they are the most conservative in terms of the agency problem hypothesis.
Flexibility Hypothesis
As previously explained, mortgage financing can constrain operational and financial flexibility since commercial mortgages typically include covenants that limit borrower discretion on decisions that affect collateral (property) value. For example, new leases, or changes to existing leases, as well as any modification to the property typically require lender approval. Additionally, lenders often require significant ongoing disclosure of property performance information (Brueggeman and Fisher (2016) ). Also, commercial mortgage contracts typically include features that limit prepayment, or ban it altogether, which constrains ongoing financing decisions and limits asset redeployment and disposal (Hardin III and Wu (2010) ). Borrower flexibility is restricted even further for CMBS loans by the use of defeasance as the dominant form of call protection (Geltner et al. (2014) ). 40 Essentially, without the burden of mortgage financing the property owner has much greater flexibility with respect to asset management decisions.
Conversations with market participants indicate that REITs do in fact avoid property-level (secured) debt to preserve operational flexibility. For example, an asset manager at a REIT in our sample stated that his company avoided property-level debt so that changes in individual tenant space demands (e.g., expansion, contraction, relocation) could be met within the firm's portfolio of properties without the need for approval from a secured debt lender. Naturally, this type of flexibility is likely to be most valuable in the market where the largest portion of firm's portfolio is located if unsecured funding is in limited supply. 41 Put differently, financial and operational flexibility is likely to be most valuable in primary markets. Following this intuition, we empirically test this hypothesis by differentiating between traditional mortgage and CMBS mortgage financing.
In Sections "Baseline Results" through "Demand-Side Evidence", we group all mortgage loans into one category. In this section, we distinguish between traditional commercial mortgages and securitized (CMBS) mortgages. We model the probability, p is , of financing outcome s ∈ {non-mortgage, traditional m on transaction i with the multinomial logit specification:
where Γ i includes all control variables from the linear probability model of equation (1). The β s 's estimated from equation (4) will be used to determine whether financing choice varies with investment characteristics. For ease of interpretation, we compute the marginal effects for Primary
Market across the three different financing alternatives. Note that the marginal effects must sum to zero across the three financing alternatives. Put differently, if Primary Market increases the likelihood of one type of financing, it must decrease the probability of one or both of the other financing outcomes. Note also that the multinomial logit model relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. Thus, in using this model, we are assuming that removing one of the financing options does not change the relative likelihoods of the other two alternatives. Table 14 reports the marginal effect estimates from the multinomial logit model of equation (4).
Column (1) shows that conditional on other covariates, the likelihood of non-mortgage financing is 5.5 percentage points higher for a primary market transaction. Nearly all of this increase in the probability of non-mortgage comes from the decreased probability of CMBS mortgage financing, REITs being four percentage points less likely to use CMBS financing in primary markets. Although negative, the marginal effect estimate for primary market is not significantly related to the likelihood of traditional mortgage financing. The results in Table 14 provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that REITs avoid the least flexible form of financing (CMBS) in primary markets, or alternatively, REITs prefer to use more inflexible financing in non-primary markets.
Conclusion
This study presents new evidence on the relation between REIT investment location and financing choice. Using a large sample of commercial property acquisitions, we show that REITs are 4 -8% more likely to use a mortgage when investing in a property located outside of their primary markets. Consistent with a demand-side story of financing choice, we show this tendency to use mortgage financing for property acquisitions in non-primary markets is stronger for REITs who have access to the public debt market. Furthermore, the evidence aligns with the hypothesis that REITs avoid using mortgages in their primary markets in order to maintain greater operational flexibility in those key markets. However, this is not necessarily the only plausible explanation of our main finding.
Location is a determining factor of the performance of real estate investments. This is the first study exploring the role of investment location on financing decisions by REITs. It contributes to the growing literature examining the determinants of REIT capital structure, particularly the choice between unsecured and secured financing. More generally, this study also contributes to the literature examining the importance of location in corporate financing. Indicator that takes a value of one if a mortgage is used to finance the property.
Primary Market
Indicator that takes a value of one if the property is located in the REIT's primary market.
Distance
The natural logarithm of the distance between the subject property and the REIT's headquarters.
Transaction Size
The natural logarithm of the purchase price of the subject property.
Portfolio Acquisition Indicator that takes a value of one if the subject property is part of a portfolio acquistion.
Firm Size
The natural logarithm of the firm's total assets in the previous year.
Leverage The firm's total debt as a percentage of total assets in the previous year.
Secured Debt
The firm's secured debt as a percentage of total debt in the previous year.
Cash The firm's cash holdings as a percentage of total assets in the previous year.
Market-to-Book The firm's market-to-book ratio in the previous year.
Total Public Debt Issuances The number of public debt issuance by the firm in the previous year.
Total Public Equity Issuances The number of public equity issuances by the firm in the previous year.
Corporate Credit Spread Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond yield relative to yield on 10-year (monthly) Treasury Constant Maturity (lagged three months).
Mortgage Spread Monthly average rate of conventional 30-year fixed rate mortgages minus the 10-year (monthly) Treasury Constant Maturity (lagged three months).
Primary Property Type Indicator that takes a value of one if the firm focuses on the property type purchased.
Primary Market Volume
The natural logarithm of one plus the annual volume of purchases in the primary market.
Other Market Volume The natural logarithm of one plus the annual volume of purchases in non-primary markets.
Property Age
The natural logarithm of one plus the property's age in years.
Leaseback
An indicator that takes a value of one if the property was purchased through a sale leaseback.
Cap Rate
The cap rate on the purchased property.
Firm Issued Public Debt (previous year) An indicator that takes a value of one if the firm issued public debt in the previous year.
Firm Issued Public Equity (previous year) An indicator that takes a value of one if the firm issued public equity in the previous year.
Transactions in Region (previous five years) The natural logarithm of one plus th enumber of transactions the firm completed in the region in the previous five years. Note: The table presents estimates from a linear probability model (OLS) of the likelihood that a firm uses a mortgage when purchasing a property. In each successive column we expand the definition of primary market. In column 1, primary market takes a value of one if the property is located in the firm's primary market. In column 2, primary market takes a value of one if the property is located in the firm's top two markets. In column 2, primary market takes a value of one if the property is located in the firm's top three markets. In column 4, primary market takes a value of one if the property is located in the firm's top four markets. The unreported control variables include Distance, Transaction Size, Portfolio Acquisition, Firm Size, Leverage, Secured Debt, Market-to-Book, Total Public Debt Issuances, Total Public Equity Issuances. White's heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 2008 -2010) . Column (2) excludes observations that occurred during the financial crisis. White's heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: The table presents estimates from a linear probability model (OLS) of the likelihood that a firm uses a mortgage when purchasing a property. Column 1 includes transactions by firms that had issued public debt at any time prior to the transaction. Column 2 includes transactions by firms that had not issued public debt prior to the transaction. The unreported control variables include Distance, Transaction Size, Portfolio Acquisition, Firm Size, Leverage, Secured Debt, Market-to-Book, Total Public Debt Issuances, Total Public Equity Issuances. White's heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: The table presents estimates from a linear probability model (OLS) of the firm's market volume on dummies for debt and equity issuance in the previous year. The dependent variable in column (1) is then natural logarithm of one plus the annual volume of purchases in the primary market. The dependent variable in column (2) is is then natural logarithm of one plus the annual volume of purchases in the markets other than the primary market. White's heteroskedasticityrobust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. (1) is the probit version of column (4) in Table 5 . White's heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Note: The table presents estimates from a linear probability model (OLS) of the likelihood that a firm uses a mortgage when purchasing a property. Assumed Mortgage is an indicator equal to one if the seller's mortgage is assumed by the buyer. Columns (1) and (2) include observations for which RCA has debt assumption information. Column (3) excludes observations where the mortgage is assumed by the buyer. White's heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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